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UNITY, COINCIDENCE, AND CONFLICT IN THE VIRTUES'
LAWRENCE C. BECKER

There are many putative virtues, and they often appear to conflict:
courage against prudence, love against fidelity. honesty against
kindness, loyalty against common decency. Such conflicts raise
questions about the coherence of the list of traits called vi rtues. And
even when those traits coincide rather than conflict, as when both love
and prudence recommend marriage. coherence is a problem because
the question of motive is almost always significant: Are mixed motives
acceptable in love, or must we strive for purity of heart? If the ideal is
pure love, can prudence be a virtue at all in that part of our lives?
Every account of the virtues raises such questions of coherence, and if
any account is to be more than an annotated inventory of traits - ifit is
to be a moral theory in any significant sense - then it must answer at
least some of those questions. Historically, they have been framed as
questions about the "unity" of the virtues, and I shall follow that
tradition. But since my object is to examine the general prospects for
coherence in virtue theory , I want to take an equally general view of the
unity problem.
Specifically, I shall assume that solutions to this problem can be of
three general sorts, each of which may be described as an argument for
the unity of the virtues.' (I) One of these is to argue for the identity of
the virtues: to argue that they are, at bottom, all the very same thing - a
perfectly seamless whole in which there are ultimately no separate
elements, and hence no conflicts or overlaps. The classic version of this
sort of argument is implicitly Socrates', in Plato's Prolagoras. 2 (2) A
seco nd sort of proposal is to argue for the organic unity of the virtues: to
argue that they are all mutually compatible and connected parts of a
whole - a perfectly harmonious whole in which, though there are
genuinely distinct elements, there are no genuine conflicts} (3) And a
third strategy is to argue for the ordinal unity of the virtues: to argue
that they are a perfectly ordered whole, unified in the sense that, given
any conflict between trails, it will always be possible in theory to
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determine which one is primary - which one is the "first virtue" in that
circumstance. 4
I will not consider, here, arguments for the identity of the virtues. The
attempt to make sense of this idea has produced extraordinarily rich
discussions, beginning with Plato and continuing at least through the
Middle Ages. 5 But it seems clear enough now that all of these discussions
lead definitively away from any interesting version of the identity
thesis. 6 Specifically, it is agreed on all sides that many separate virtues
are distinguishable, and to say that they are all simply distinct
manifestations of the very same thing (say of practical wisdom or
knowledge) does nothing to answer the coherence question, since it will
immediately reappear as the question of how to resolve conflicts between
the different manifestations. To reply that such conflicts will be resolved
by practical wisdom in its conflict-resolution mode is not very helpful at
all.
What is helpful, however, is to explore the idea that there might be
some underlying trait or traits that generate all of the virtues, or that
connect and regulate them. This idea leads to various instructive
accounts of organic and ordinal unity. and eventually (I believe) to a
particular sort of ordinal account.
My project in this paper is to argue for an ordinal account ofthe unity
of the virtues in the following way: (I) by showing the importance of a
neglected class of questions about coherence - questions I shall refer to
as coincidence problems; (2) by organizing conventional accounts of
the unity of the virtues in a perspicuous way, and showing that they fail
to solve coincidence problems; and (3) by describing the sorts of ordinal
accounts that are available, sketching the outlines of one organized
around practical wisdom, and indicating how it would handle coherence
questions of all sorts, including those of coincidence.

COINCIDENCE PROBLEMS
It is important to see that even if a virtue theory can eliminate conflicts
between traits , a large class of difficult practical problems is very likely
to remain: namely, the problems that arise when two or more traits give
the same guidance for conduct, but when we think only one of the traits
should be controlling. ("Yes of course I wanted you to keep the promise.
But because you wanted to , not because it was your duty. '')
I'll call these cases coincidence problems. Love and duty often
coincide for practical purposes - as often, probably. as they conflict.
And the same is true of prudence and duty. and prudence and love. An
account of the unity of the virtues that solves all the conflict problems
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but leaves these coincidence problems untouched is inadequate. Part of
my agenda in this paper is to show that traditional accounts of the unity
of the virtues are inadequate injust this way. To do this, however, I need
to characterize coincidence problems a bit more fully ~ to show, for
example, that they are not simply conflicts in disguise, and to show as
well that they are pervasive enough to present a serious test for any
account of the unity of the virtues.
In general, coincidence problems arise for acts that are defined in
part by specific motives - motives that are constitutive of a virtue, and
which come from that virtue. To explain:
Many acts are defined withoUi reference to a specific motive that is
constitutive of a virtue. Obedience to law is an example. One can obey
the law from a very wide range of motives, including sheer perversity
(where perversity is defined as doing the opposite of what people
expect). Perverse obedience to the law is still obedience. But many other
acts are defined in terms of specific motives. Benevolence is an example.
One cannot act benevolently out of a wide range of motives, but only
from one motive - roughly, the desire to do good for others. That
motive is what makes an act a genuinely benevolent one, and it is a
motive constitutive of the virtue of benevolence.
Now when an act is defined in part by reference to a specific motive,
coming from a specific virtue, we can get the following sort of
coincidence: Several virtues might prompt a person to do the same
thing - say, give a gift. If the gift is given out of prudence, it will be a
prudential gift; if given oul of benevolence, a benevolent one; and so
forth. There is no conflict in this, but there is a problem for a theory of
the virtues. The problem is to decide which motive, and therefore which
virtue, should be the controlling one. And more generally, the problem
is to find an account of the unity of the virtues that explains how one
can be both prudent and benevolent in cases where there is coincidence
rather than conflict.
Such problems are pervasive. Noticing two general classes of them
should make the point. Note first that prudence, in a reasonably just
social order, is likely to coincide with virtually every other virtue at
some point. That is , if social life is reasonably just, people will typically
get what they deserve, and it will generally be prudent to do the things
one ought to do - to do the fair thing, the generous thing, in short the
virtuous thing. Second, note that the old conflicts between duty and
inclination, and between duty and a concern for consequences, have
their counterparts in these coincidence problems. If fidelity, love and
benevolence all prompt me to be faithful, the problem is not one of
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conflict but coincidence. I must decide not what to do but how to do it.
And such problems are obviously numerous.
Now it may be objected that these so-called coincidence problems are
really just disguised conflicts. The point may be put this way: No two
virtues can ever recommend the same act if they require different
motives for it. Ifprudence recommends a prudent gift, and benevolence
recommands a benevolent gift, their recommendations do not coincide
but rather conflict. Presumably. then, any account of the unity of the
virtues which solved conflicts would solve these purported coincidences
as well. If all coincidences are disguised conflicts, there is no point in
distinguishing the two sorts of problems here.
This objection brings out a reply that illustrates the depth of
coincidence problems. Assume a reasonably just, stable society (or
institution, or relationship) in which frankly prudential gifts are
regarded with contempt, and either refused or accepted without
reciprocity. Genuinely benevolent gifts, however, are accepted warmly,
reciprocated, and sustain valuable cooperative practices. What
prudence recommends in such a setting is the cultivation of the virlue of
benevolence, and hence the benevolent motive, rather than the
simulation of it , or frankly prudential giving.' (Simulation will
sometimes not be prudent, since in a just setting it will often be
discovered and then will never be rewarded as fully as the real thing.) So
prudence will recommend not only the same overt act as benevolence
but the same motive as well, and the coincidence will be a real one. The
problem will lie in the fact that in one case prudence is the ultimate
ground for the benevolence and in the other case it is not. The account
of the unity of the virtues should tell us whether prudence should be
such a ground. As noted above, I divide the attempts to give a unitary
account into three sorts, of which only arguments for organic unity and
for ordinal unity are plausible. I turn first to the organic versions.
ORGANIC UNITY
The fundamental problem with all accounts of organic unity is that they
see m doomed to be too general to yield concrete moral guidance, and
unable to handle at all the question of which virtue should be the
leading one in cases of coincidence. These difficulties will ultimately
prompt me to turn to an ordinal account, but it is worth explaining in a
bit more detail the motivation for and problems with organic unity
views.
Ideal Characler. Following Aristotle, virtue theorists have often
begun by sketching a description of human nature, or human agency, or
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human flourishing from which at least a schematic picture of ideal
moral character can be drawn. And it is tempting to hope that
definitions of the several virtues can then be carved out of the picture
like Ihe pieces of ajig saw puzzle. Such pieces will by definilion fit back
together to form a unified conception of virtue. The task is presumably
analogous to the one of defining the best body-type for a certain sort of
athlete. We start with an account of what the athlete must be able to do,
and what sort of strength, speed, agility, flexibility, endurance and so
forth are required to do it. We can then decide, roughly, what an ideal
athlete of that sort will look like, feature by feature - how tall, how
heavy. and the like - assuming, perhaps, that when all this is put back
together we do not want a picture that looks like committee work. The
idea here is that perhaps we can do something similar in the case of ideal
moral character.
But there is a notorious problem with this: the only plausible accounts
of ideal character available (or ever likely to be available) are too
schematic to yield the sort of definitions of particular virtues that tell us
much, in detail, about how we are to resolve conflict and coincidence
problems. Assume, for example, that we take the necessities for human
flourishing as the guide for constructing a description ofideal character.
The question, then, is this: Given the general limits of human nature
and the human condition, what sort of human being would flourish best
as a human being? The answers seems to be that many identifiable types
are able to flourish equally well. And each type appears 10 have
generosity, say, and courage and prudence of somewhat different sorts
and amounts. So we will get no guidance at all, on such an account, for
theoretical questions about conflicts and coincidences. Or rather, the
best we will be able to do is to produce some feeble advice relative to
each person: "Well, if you want to go on in roughly this way, then you'll
need more courage than I've seen so far. But of course if you'd rather try
a slighlly different way of life, which many people have pursued wilh
success, then mOTe courage won't be needed. Just more discretion."
This is enough to suggest that the attempt to get a unified account of
the virtues from a highly schematic picture of ideal character will fail to
solve the unity problem. And as long as humn nature is as protean as it
is, and the human condition as various as it is, the prospect of having
more than a schematic account is nil.
Reciprocal interdependence. Another tack is to try to establish that
the virtues - at least a few fundamental ones - are mutually
interdependent, so much so that it is not possible to have anyone of
them without having them all. This, in fact, is what a long line of
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commentators have taken Socrates' position in the Pro/agoras to have
been, and Aristotle held it explicitly. (See Nicomachean Ethics 1145a.)
Such a view is now commonly referred to as an equivalence thesis, and
expressed as a set of biconditionals: One has the virtue of justice if and
only if one also has the virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage, and all
the others.
This is an initially baffling position, since many pairs of virtues seem
either mutually exclusive or thoroughly independent: wit and humility,
humility and magnanimity, justice and mercy, chastity and conjugal
fidelity. And then there is the question of explaining the equivalence.
Even if the material biconditionals happen to be true, we need to
understand why they are true. Accidental equivalence is not enough to
establish that the virtues are a unity.
Attempts to argue for the reciprocal interdependence of the virtues,
then, tend to restrict their attention to a short list of fundamental
virtues - say justice, wisdom, courage and temperance - and then to
offer either causal or conceptual analyses of the connections between
them. An example of an argument for a causal connection is the
argument that all the virtues on the list have a common source - say, in
the workings of practical intelligence over the course of normal human
development. This is a plausible reading of Aristotle's contentions in
Nicomachean Ethics 1144b-1145a. And if the list is restricted to the
fundamental virtues (as Aristotle did not do), the argument is convincing
enough. Anyone who has the necessary good sense, prudence, and
intelligence to cope successfully with a reasonably full life - i.e. , has
practical wisdom - is certainly going to develop traits that can be
called courage, temperance, wisdom and justice. And it may even be
plausible to suppose that those traits would all have to arise together,
even though they might develop at different rates or to different degrees.
Ifso, then it would follow that to have anyone ofthem would be to have
all of them, and the biconditionals linking them would be true. But it
does not follow from this sort of causal argument alone that the traits so
generated would be free of conflicts and coincidences in a way that
handles the coherence problem. To get that result - even for a restricted
list of the virtues - we would need to add the sort of regulative
principle discussed below. So the mere causal interdependence of the
virtues is not enough.
Similarly for attempts to trace conceptual connections, at least insofar
as I understand them. Here the idea is to show that all the virtues are
connected to one or more central, or focal, or nodal traits (and thus,
"through" those traits, to each other). The fundamental virtues are
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often candidates for this role, and the argument funs something like
this: To possess a virtue is to have a given trait in the proper degree and
manner. It is possible, for example, to be generous, or courageous, or
prudent "to a fault," or in a way that is self-defeating. To have such
inappropriate traits is not to have the virtues of generosity, courage,
and so forth, but rather some closely related vices. 8 Now if we look
closely, the argument continues, we will see that the "proper degree and
manner" for each trait is defined by reference to a central set of
reciprocally interdependent traits - the fundamental virtues. So
exercising the virtue of courage (that is, courage of the proper degree
and manner) necessarily involves conduct that is not only courageous
but also temperate, wise and just; the virtue of temperance similarly
involves courage, wisdom and justice; and so on for wisdom and justice.
Thus it is true, for those virtues at least that to have one is to have them
all. Other traits, such as modesty or generosity may be connected to the
central virtues, so that "'through" the central ones all the virtues are
connected or unified. But the relationship between peripheral and
central virtues is presumably not always biconditional. Having a
peripheral virtue may always entail being courageous, then, and wise,
just and temperate as well; but presumably it is possible to be temperate
without being chaste.
But the conceptual equivalence of the virtues leaves coherence
problems untouched. If we accept the equivalence, all we know is that
we cannot have one virtue without the other. That does nothing to
insure against conflicts, for perhaps a conflict will simply mean that we
can have neither one, or that the one we give priority to will simply
damage but not eliminate the other. And it does nothing to insure
against coincidences, ;ither. Again we seem drawn toward the idea of
an underlying regulative principle that could coordinate things.
Regulative Principles. So another line to take toward an organic view
of unity is to try to develop the suggestion that all the virtues exhibit a
regulative principle which effectively coordinates them. One obvious
candidate is some version of an Aristotelian principle of moderation,
derived from the observation that many of the virtues stand between
disreputable extremes - courage, for example, being somewhere
between cowardice and foolhardiness. And it may be that all of them
involve a sort of prudence, or moderation, or sweet reasonableness that
makes them self-adjusting in situations of potential conllict. 9 This
would certainly justify the label of organic unity, for it is analogous to
the homeostatic mechanisms (e.g., with respect to respiration, body
temperature, fluid balance) found in complex organisms. The thought
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is that each of the virtues is sensitive to the operation oftbe others, and
reacts reciprocally to them. Honesty, for example, is merely brutal
candor unless it is sensitive to circumstance, and coordinated with
kindness and tact as well as with fidelity (consider testimony given
under oath), and with justice (consider cases in which telling the truth
will cause the wicked to prosper), and on and on.
Such reflection reinforces the contention that an ununified bundle of
virtues account is theoretically insupportable. and that some theory of
organic unity will best reflect both the diversity we see in the virtues and
the dynamic process of adjustment they appear to go through with
respect to each other. But it also reinforces the desirability of finding a
fairly simple regulative principle at the bottom of all of this. If we
cannot do that, but instead must pick apart each oftbe virtues to find its
own regulative principles, we will have a very long project. (An
indefinitely long one, in fact, since there seems to be no limit, in
principle, to the various ways of cutting up ideal character into separate
virtues.)
I believe, however, that this approach to organic unity, long or short,
should be abandoned. Or rather, I believe that when pursued, it will
inevitably collapse into either an unappealing argument for the identity
of the virtues or an argument for their ordinal unity. My reasons are
these:
Think about conflicts, and the way a regulative principle would have
to work to insure that the virtue of honesty, say, was always compatible
with prudence,justice, kindness, loyalty and the rest. (I) It could work
by dissolving connicts as they arise (as oposed to settling them); by
modulating each virtue until it fits with the other, similarly modulated
oncs. This sort of conflict resolution is essentially the process of turning
down the contrast between conflicting elements. That is an instructive
metaphor, in fact, because the limiting result of turning down the
contrast is a blank screen: identity; a perfectly seamless whole in which
there are no contrasting elements at all. 10 And this seems to be what
happens to the separate virtues (on some accounts) when we press
persistently for the dissolution of conflicts between them; they dissolve
into one another - into one featureless thing called virtue. Honesty
isn't simply the disposition to tell the truth, then. Rather, it is essentially
a certain region of an otherwise undifferentiated form of wisdom, or
knowledge, or ideal character - the region that concerns truthtelling.
And the same, mUlatis mutandis, then happens to every other virtue.
Each is dissolved into an account of the same one thing. When this
happens, the notion of organic unity collapses by stages into identity.
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(2) The other way a regulative principle could work is by avoiding
conflicts as they arise - by slopping each disposition short of conflict,
leaving the contrast between them intact. Now if each of the virtues has
this sort of collision avoidance system, and nothing else, we will instantly
get a four-way stop problem: each stops short of collision, and then no
one makes the first move. The obvious solution to such deadlocks is to
have some right-of-way rules - some priority rules - about who goes
first. But when those sorts of rules are added, this account of organic
unity has collapsed into ordinal unity. That is, at this point we have
view of the virtues that holds them to be a heterogeneous but ordered
unity.
One further remark about all these organic views of unity: It seems to
me that none of them can do anything to help resolve the coincidence
problems - without, again, collapsing into either an identity view or an
ordinal one. Organic unity is, after all, a thesis about the harmony ofthe
virtues - about the absence of conflict between them. It is not a thesis
about what is to be done about conflict-free cases in which we want a
particular virtue to be the leading one. If the virtues are not distinct
enough to admit this problem, then we have gone back to an identity
doctrine. If they are distinct enough to admit it, then no matter how
good an account of organic unity we have, we will need an ordinal one
in addition.
ORDINAL UNITY
It thus seems reasonable to move away from an organic conception of
the virtues, except insofar as it can be incorporated into an ordinal one.
What I want to do in this final portion of the paper is show which sort of
ordinal account is most promising.
'

Types of Ordinal Accounts
Unique ordering. There are at least three ways to get a completely
ordered set of the virtues. One is astrict numerical order in which each
virtue has a unique ordinal status: There is exactly one virtue in first
place, exactly one other virtue in second, and so on. There are not ties
for nth place. The first virtue then dominates all the rest, the second
dominates all but the first, etc. Since every conflict or coincidence
necessarily pits a higher against a lower virtue, every case will be
decidable. The first virtue will be the controlling one whenever it
conflicts or coincides with anything below it; the second will be
controlling only in cases when the first virtue is indifferent to it (that is,
neither conflicts nor coincides with it); and so on down the line. The
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only way that a Little trait like tact will ever be expressed, then, is when
all the traits above it are indifferent to it and. so to speak, pass it
through. The proposal I will sketch below involves arguing for a unique
first virtue. But the idea that we might be able to justify a unique
ordering all the way from first to last seems too improbable to pursue.
Branching structures. That leaves two other possibilities. One is a
pyramidal or downwardly branching structure in which two or morc
secondary virtues are dominated by the first, each secondary virtue
dominates its own set of tertiary ones, and so forth.

VI
·0

I
V2(a)

I

I

V2(b)

I

I

I

V2(c)

I

I

I

V3(a) .................................................... ............................ .. .......... V3(z)
........ .. ........ etc.

I

etc.
The difficulty here is obviously that conflicts and coincidences between
secondary virtues or between any others at the same ordinal level, might
proliferate. For conflicts, we might try (!) to argue for the additivity of
virtues (that is, for the thesis that the virtuous act is whatever is
recommended by the greater number of traits on a given level), and then
put up with the few remaining ties. But notice that this does nOlhing to
resolve coincidence problems. And the prospect of trying to arrange an
intricate branching structure in which no such problems could arise is a
baffling one. So I put this aside as well, except to note that my proposal
below will involve a very simple, two-level branching structure.
Decision procedures. The remaining alternative is to try to find a
decision procedure - a set of considerations that will decide any
conflict or coincidence that arises, not in terms of a rigid, fixed, overall
ordinal structure but rather in terms of a method for coming to
conclusions. This, it seems to me, is the only hope (faint as it may be) for
resolving priority problems for the virtues.
The idea of adecision procedure in this context is simply this: there is
a decision procedure for a given conflict or coincidence if and only if
there is a series of deliberative steps which will necessarily identify one
virtue as the one that ought to be dominant in that case. The virtues are
completely ordered by such a procedure if it will decide any arbitrarily
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selected conflict or coincidence. Of course it would be a trivial and
pointless exercise to construct either an arbitrary procedure (like a coin
flip), or onc contrived to yield predetermined results (like an algorithm
for generating a predetermined unique ordering). And it would be vain
to expect the procedure to be a "clerical routine" that CQuld be applied
mechanically to a problem, or that would reach a definitive rather than
a provisional conclusion. Those expectations 3rc appropriate to
mathematics but not to ethics. What is appropriate to ethics is rather a
procedure which (I) is controlled by ordering principles constructed
from reasoned moral deliberation about the proper ordinal relationships
between various subsets of the virtues, (2) is applicable to all ordinal
questions about the virtues(i.e., is complete), and (3) has a non-arbitrary
mechanism for getting provisional closure on such questions when the
ordering principles are inconclusive. I I
PRACTICAL WISDOM AS A CONTROLLING VIRTUE
The foregoing analysis suggests a way in which practical wisdom, in the
Aristotelian sense, could provide the necessary unity for the virtues and a type of ordinal unity that resolves both conflict and coincidence
problems. Accounts or organic unity have often made practical wisdom
the central element. Since I believe the idea of organic unity should be
abandoned here, I reject those accounts. But I think the Aristotelian
conception of practical wisdom fits very well into an ordinal scheme. 12
What I have in mind borrows a good deal from three notions involved
in the accounts previously discussed: One is the concept of a central,
regulative virtue. Another is the idea of a downwardly branching
ordinal structure - a very flat one in this case, with the controlling or
regulative virtue as the only one of the first order, and all the other
virtues as second-order ones. And the third notion is that of a decision
procedure - that is, a process through which any given conflict or
coincidence wil1 be resolved. This idea may be represented as a two-level
branching structure:
controlling virtue

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

VI ... V2 ........................................................................................... Vn

What these three notions suggest is the following possibility.
Suppose we think of practical wisdom (phronesis) as the trait that
controls all the others, at every moment of reflective conduct. At the
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moment of choice, its function is to elicit the appropriate act and
motivation by invoking the appropriate second-order virtue (prudence,
benevolence or whatever). And as long as only one trait is invoked,
there will be no conflict or coincidence problems here. Reflective choice,
for the virtuous person, is a univalent response. That is practical
wisdom at the moment of choice.
In deliberation, the function of practical wisdom is to order the whole
range of possibilities for conduct in such a way that the appropriate act
and motivation will stand out as such, and as constitutive of a particular
virtue - the virtue that will be the dominant one in that context. Again,
as long as only one trait is selected, there will be no conflict or
coincidence problems here. Deliberation, for the virtuous person, ends
in a univalent response. That is practical wisdom in deliberation.
And finally, for the full-scale rational assessment of conduct (either
retrospective or hypothetical), the function of practical wisdom is to
produce a coherent, context-sensitive general picture of the
appropriateness of various acts and motives, as constitutive of various
virtues. Conflict and coincidence problems will be avoided here as long
as all other virtues are subordinate to practical wisdom, and none of
them has priority over any other.
This conception of practical wisdom is of a purely instrumental
virtue - one completely empty of its own ends, as it were, except the
instrumental one of finding the means to the various ends given to it in
situations of choice, deliberation, or rational assessment. Practical
wisdom must handle every given end impartially, on (initially) equal
terms. In itself. then, it is thus neither egoistic or altruistic, competitive
or cooperative, benevolent or miserly, merciful or just.
Now the plausibility of this sort of solution to the priority problem this controlling virtue version of an ordinal account of the unity of the
virtues - rests squarely on the possibility of describing and justifying a
decision procedure (as a part of practical wisdom) that will
nonarbitrarily select one and only one trait in any given choice or
deliberative situation. And that seems to me to be a much less daunting
task than that of getting a unique and complete ordering, or a long
branching structure.
In general terms, what we need to do is describe a way to find , in a
given situation, what counts as the appropriate trait to invoke. And
there is a familiar description we can give. A highly compressed sketch
of it would go something like this.
A trait is the appropriate one for a given situation if that trait is the
one best suited (instrumentally)
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selected conflict or coincidence. Of course it would be a trivial and
pointless exercise to construct either an arbitrary procedure (like acoin
flip), or one contrived to yield predetermined results (like an algorithm
for generating a predetermined unique ordering). And it would be vain
to expect the procedure to be a "clerical routine" that could be applied
mechanically to a problem, or that would reach a definitive rather than
a provisional conclusion. Those expectations are appropriate to
mathematics but not to ethics. What is appropriate to ethics is rather a
procedure which (I) is controlled by ordering principles constructed
from reasoned moral deliberation about the proper ordinal relationships
between various subsets of the virtues, (2) is applicable to all ordinal
questions about the virtues (i.e., is complete), and (3) has a non-arbitrary
mechanism for getting provisional closure on such questions when the
ordering principles are inconciusive. 1I
PRACTICAL WISDOM AS A CONTROLLING VIRTUE
The foregoing analysis suggests a way in which practical wisdom, in the
Aristotelian sense, could provide the necessary unity for the virtues and a type of ordinal unity that resolves both conflict and coincidence
problems. Accounts or organic unity have often made practical wisdom
the central element. Since I believe the idea of organic unity should be
abandoned here, I reject those accounts. But I think the Aristotelian
conception of practical wisdom fits very well into an ordinal scheme. 12
What I have in mind borrows a good deal from three notions involved
in the accounts previously discussed: One is the concept of a central,
regulative virtue. Another is the idea of a downwardly branching
ordinal structure - a very flat one in this case, with the controlling or
regulative virtue as the only one of the first order, and all the other
virtues as second-order ones. And the third notion is that of a decision
procedure - that is, a process through which any given conflict or
coincidence will be resolved. This idea may be represented as a two-level
branching structure:
controlling virtue

I

I

VI.. .V2.

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

............. ..... ..... ........................................ ,.. .............. Vn

What these three notions suggest is the following possibility.
Suppose we think of practical wisdom (phronesis) as the trait that
controls all the others, at every moment of reflective conduct. At the
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(a) to elicit the conduct which will achieve the greatest sum of
one's immediate ends,
(b) assessed in terms of their compatibility with and effectiveness
as means for achieving the greatest sum of one's intermediate
ends,
(c) assessed in terms of their compatibility with and effectiveness
as means for achieving the greatest sum of one's ultimate
ends,
(d) assessed in terms of their compability with and effectiveness
in sustaining social relationships and associations,
(e) assessed in terms of their ability to engender and sustain the
satisfaction of (al the sorts of immediate ends characteristic
of people whose actual immediate ends are appropriate, given
existing conditions, for (b') those intermediate ends
appropriate for ... etc.
This spiral process becomes, with each successive round, increasingly
general - increasingly centered on the traits that can enrich any
person's life, taken as a whole and considered in its circumstances. Yet
the process never loses its rootedness in individual interest, or covertly
imposes an end other than that of practical wisdom. This confirms the
claim that we are dealing with a genuine decision procedure here, rather
than a disguised substantive principle; and it helps to clarify the way in
which such a procedure could be at once empty of its own ends and of
use in unifying the virtues.
The familiarity of this process does not show, of course, that we will
be able to get an adequate ordinal account of the unity of the virtues
with it. But it does give some hope. The hope comes from three sources.
First, as described, practical wisdom relies solely on instrumental
reaoning, which we understand as well or better than any kind of
reasoning we do. Second, there are familiar procedures for getting
closure, for practical purposes, in such reasoning when it is inconclusive.
And third, the notion that instrumental rationality must ultimately
dominate all other traits is situated firmly in a long tradition of
productive moral theorizing, from Plato onward.
It is worth pausing, here, to note two things: First, the dominance of
the trait of practical wisdom does not entail the intrusive or pervasive
use of instrumental reasoning in everyday life. Fluency in a language
means having a good enough sense of the language - a good enough
eye and ear for it - that grammatical analysis is seldom necessary.
Likewise, practical wisdom seldom requires detailed instrumental
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reasoning. Second, since practical wisdom is empty of its own
substantive ends, and is obviously sensitive to circumstance, it can unify
a wide range of character types. It is thus compatible with liberal ideals.
Whether the dominance of practical wisdom will also do more
substantive work for virtue theory, by somehow ruling out the standard
types of vicious character, is a subject for another essay. Here my aims
were simply to argue that the account of the unity of the virtues should
be an ordinal one, and that the ordinal account should be a two-tiered
decision procedure with practical wisdom as the only first-order trait.
THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY
WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA 23185
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NOTES
• Earlier versions of this paper were discussed in the Faculty Writing Workshop
and the Senior Seminar in Philosophy at Hollins College. I am grateful to the
members of those groups, as well as to the Editor of this journal, for many useful
comments. Nickolas Pappas, in particular, urged me to emphasize the problem
of overlapping or coincident virtues, and to be less hasty in dismissing a two-tiered
ordering. Alvord Beardslee had earlier provided important bibliographicadvice.
For a sketch of the complex early Western history of the unity-of-the-virtues
debate, see James J. Walsh, "Buridan on the Connection ofthe Virtues," Journal
ofthe History of Philosophy 24 (1986): 453-482, at 454-458. And for illuminating
work on the way the problem arises in Confucian ethics, see Antonio S. Cua,
"Hsiln Tzu and the Unity of Virtues," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14 (1987):
381 - 400.
2 For illuminating defenses of the plausibility of Socrates' commitment to tbe
identity view in the Protagoras (at 329 ff) and some other dialogues, see Terry
Penner, "The Unity of Virtue," The Philosophical Review 82 (1973): 35-68, and
Michael T. Ferejohn, "The Unity of Virtue and the Objects of Socratic Inquiry,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 20(1982): 1-22. Both take the position (for
somewhat different reasons) that Socrates could plausibly have been asserting
the identity of the virtues with a common "state of the soul" which produces or
grounds them all. And if two or more things are all identical with the same further
thing, they are identical with each other as well. For a careful statement of the
view most commentators have held - that Socrates could have been asserting
only an equivalence relation rather tban identity - see Gregory Vlastos, "The
Unity of the Virtues," Platonic Studies (Princeton, Princeton University Press,
1973), pp. 221-269. It should also be remarked that one can find denials of both
the identity and equivalence views in a number of Plato's dialogues. Penner
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asserts this ab.>ut Euthyphro. Mena, and EUlhydemus, and notes that in
Statesman 305-308, it is argued that conflicts between the virtues are possible.
3 This seems to have been Aristotle's view, in the sense that he held the virtues to be
generated and united by a kind of practical intelligence or wisdom (phronesis).
See Nicomachean Ethics I 144b38-1145a2, where he says that while it is possible
to have some and not others of the "natura'" virtues, this is not possible for the
"virtues that someone must have to be called unconditionally good; for as soon as
he has intelligence, which is a single state, he has all the virtues as well." This is
Terence Irwin's translation (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1985).
The term that Irwin translates here with the word intelligence isphronesis, which
is more commonly translated now as practical wisdom. It is roughly equivalent to
the Latin prudenlia and has therefore sometimes been translated (misleadingly
for modern eyes) as prudence. In any case, as Irwin points out on p. 412, Aristotle
claims that phronesis "is both a necessary and a sufficient condition of complete
VIRTUE of character (1107al. 1138b I 8-34, II44bI4-1I45a, 1178aI6- 19) ....
[and that becausephronesis] is practical, someone cannOI both have it and fail to
act correctly ... (1145a4-9, 1152a6-14)." Given the enthusiasm with which
commentators have taken up the challenge of explaining how it might be that this
one trait could entail all the rest , and given the potential for misunderstanding
Aristotle on this point, Ross's choice in the Oxford edition of Aristotle(preserved
by Urmson in the 1984 revised edition, and used by Ostwald as well) seems the
best one: they all translatephronesis as practical wisdom. Early Christian thinkers
revised not only the list of virtues but the account of their organic unity. St.
Jerome apparently endorsed the view that he who has one virtue has them all, but
others followed St. Augustine in rejecting that idea. See Augustine's 0" the
Morals a/the Catholic Church, Chapter XV, where the four fundamental virtues
(temperance, courage or fortitude, justice, and prudence) are all considered as
differing forms of the perfect love of God.
For some later medieval developments, see Walsh, op. cit.
4
Pluralism, in this context, either in the form of cheerful liberalism or in the form
of a tragic view of life, is not a solution to the problem I am discussing, but rather
the rejection of it. Pluralism is the acceptance of an account in which there are
genuinely conflicting, equally fundamental virtues. And of course the various
skeptical arguments that make so much ofthe significance of moral dilemmas are
committed to saying that this problem about the virtues cannot legitimately be
either solved or rejected.
s Walsh ,op.cit.
6 Ferejohn, op. cit.
7 Some attempts to solve prisoner's dilemmas and free rider problems take a
similar line. See Lawrence C. Becker, "The Free Rider Problem," in Harlan
Miller and William H. Williams (eds.), The limits 0/ U/iJitarianism (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), and David Gauthier, Morals byAgreemem
(Oxford: Oxford University press, 1985). More generally, utilitarians have
occasionally made arguments about the utility of developing certain traits that
short-circuit the practice of making decisions based on the utilitarian principle.
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And my argument in Reciprocily( Boston: Routledge & Kegan Pau~ 1986), while
not utilitarian, certainly argues for the cultivation of a disposition to reciprocate
that preempts rational self-maximizing behavior in many circumstances.
8

See Gary Watson , "Virtues in Excess," Philosophical Studies 46 (1984): 57-74

9

for an illuminating review of these matters.
Moderation is not the only candidate for a regulative principle. See Walsh, op.
cit., pp. 455 - 456.

In the earlier(medieval] period, the major concern was for the relation orthe
virtues divinely infused through grace with the naturally acquired virtues. A
common doctrine was that the infused virtue of charity drives out the vices
and serves as the cause or from of all the virtues, thus uniting them.
Occasionally the four cardinal virtues were trealed as infused ... A consequence
of Ihese views is that the acquired virtues, considered in themselves , are not
connected, so that for them it is not true that he who has one must have them
aiL .. (455)
He goes on. however, to illustrate the tendency to slip back into an equivalence
account.

10

II

This independence of the acquired virtues was sometimes significantly
qualified by the claim that the exercise of any virtue ought to be made with
moderation , forcefulness, insight and adaption to the end, and thus
temperately, courageously, prudently, and justly. This positing of a set of
general cardinal conditions was taken 10 show the way that virtues can be
connected, but it bequeathed the problem of clearly distinguishing between
those general conditions and the associated virtues ...
[Thomas Aquinas] Following Aristotle closely.. distinguished between
natural propensities and developed virtuous habits. The propensities are not
necessarily connected. The habits develop through interaction with prudence,
and since prudence has a single ultimate end, the moral virtues are connected
through it. (455-456)
Consider this passage from John Buridan's Questiones ..... translated by James J .
Walsh and printed in "Buridan on the Connection of the Virtues," op . cit., p. 480:
Therefore it seems to me that each of these habits is perfected through its
connection with the other, and that one virtue, perfectly prepared for by
acting well is constituted from them. For I think that the second habit. other
things being equal, is stronger in one who has the first habit than in one who
lacks it. II also seems 10 me that virtue complete in this way is single in species,
or even numerically ... (480)
A procedure such as this may (or may not) produce an invariant ordering of the
virtues. If it does, it will have the same practical result as a substantive principle
for achieving ordinal unity. But "strictly speaking." as Asa Kasher has pointed
out to me in correspondence, it will not yield "an ordinal s truc{Ure in the class of
virtues, but rather in the class of instances of application of virtues
considerations." This may lead one to suspect the existence of an underlying,
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subtanti ve element in the procedu re, itself describable as a vi rtue. The acco unt of
practical wisdom introduced below is meant to deal with that suspicion .
12

Asa Kasher has brought to my attention a boo k by Troels Engberg- Pederse n,
Aristotle's Theory of Mora / Insight (Oxford : Clarend on Press, 1983), which
bea rs on the material in th is sectio n of my paper. Engberg- Pederson argues
(Chapter 6) that phronesis, fo r Aristotle, is a so rt of "cognitive grasp" of or
" mo ral insight" into practical si lUations defi ned (in part) by desi res th at a re
indepe ndent of it.
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